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Robert Mapplethorpe, Self-Portrait (1988), Tate Modern

INTRODUCTION
This Article explores the dramatic changes that have occurred over
the last thirty years in the First Amendment doctrines governing sexual
speech. As a prism through which to evaluate these changes, I consider
the thirtieth anniversary of the landmark Robert Mapplethorpe trial,
the first censorship prosecution against an art museum in the history
of this country and the defining battle in the culture wars that roiled
post-Reagan America. The target was the exhibition of formally beautiful, sexually hard-core photographs by Robert Mapplethorpe on view at
a museum in Cincinnati. The controversy that erupted over those images—fueled by anxieties about AIDS, homosexuality, sadomasochism,
race, government funding for the arts, and the vanishing boundary
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between art and pornography—spilled out of the courtroom into popular culture and into the halls of the United States Congress.
This Article looks back at this landmark art trial and establishes
its continuing relevance for free speech law. What emerges is a surprising story about dramatic changes in the major First Amendment rules
governing sexual speech. In particular, I look at the shifting trajectories
over the years of the two legal doctrines that were at the center of the
Mapplethorpe case—obscenity law and child pornography law—and I
show the radically divergent paths these two areas of law have taken.
While obscenity law has receded in importance, and while the allegedly
obscene photos from the trial have become widely accepted in museums
and in the art market, child pornography law has followed the opposite
course. In contrast to the allegedly obscene pictures, which pose almost
no legal risk today, the two photographs of children that were on trial
have become more, not less, controversial over the past thirty years, to
the point where curators are quietly reluctant to show these images at
all. In my view, these photos now occupy a space of legal and moral
uncertainty.
In recent years there has been a growing art world “obsession” with
Robert Mapplethorpe.1 Three major museums have staged retrospectives of Mapplethorpe’s work in the past few years.2 Once denounced on
the floor of the U.S. Senate, his work viewed as menacing and contagious, Mapplethorpe has now emerged as a market and museum darling, to the point where a critic recently declared that the art world had
been gripped with a case of “Mapplethorpe fever.”3 The once-taboo photos that were on trial for obscenity have now become prized in museums
and in the art market. Yet in spite of this fever, and the easy acceptance
of the pictures that were once charged with violating obscenity law, the
two images of children from the trial have quietly receded from view,
and their legal status has become more fragile than it once was.
What happened to change the dynamics of showing these works,
legally and culturally? And what explains the differing trajectories of
the two major doctrines governing sexual speech? The trial marked the
last gasp of obscenity law, which has since become legally inert. Yet
child pornography law has expanded dramatically over the same period.

1

See Rain Embuscado, Forthcoming Book of His Archive Adds to Recent Robert Mapplethorpe
Fever, ARTNET NEWS (Feb. 9, 2016), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/robert-mapplethorpe-ar
chive-published-422789 [https://perma.cc/C2VF-LUP3].
2
See Robert Mapplethorpe: The Perfect Medium, J. PAUL GETTY MUSEUM, http://www.getty.
edu/art/exhibitions/mapplethorpe/ [https://perma.cc/N3P2-2546] (last visited Mar. 25, 2020) (website for Getty show); Robert Mapplethorpe: The Perfect Medium, LOS ANGELES CTY. MUSEUM OF
ART, https://www.lacma.org/art/exhibition/robert-mapplethorpe-perfect-medium [https://perma.cc
/X5JK-D457] (last visited Mar. 27, 2020) (website for LACMA show).
3
Embuscado, supra note 1.
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In tracing the divergent paths taken by these two doctrinal areas, three
themes emerge: First, I show the direct relationship between obscenity
law’s decline and child pornography law’s ascent. Second, I explore the
shift within free speech law about what kinds of harms should be legally
cognizable. Both obscenity law and child pornography law are premised
on notions of harm that are anomalous within First Amendment doctrine. Yet over the last thirty years, the diffuse notion of harm that animated obscenity law has been eclipsed by the concrete vision of harm
that undergirds child pornography law: harm baked into the production
of the material itself. Finally, I argue that shifting cultural norms in
the wake of the Mapplethorpe trial have had a profound impact on First
Amendment law, even as the law has affected those norms. Free speech
law governed this chapter in the culture wars, yet in surprising ways,
the changing social norms unleashed by the culture wars have also governed free speech law.
Part I explores Mapplethorpe’s artistic process and legacy and tells
the story of the nation-wide scandal that erupted around his work, culminating in the landmark 1990 trial. In Part II, I argue that a combination of AIDs panic, racism, and homophobia, as well as backlash
against the changing role of art in society, made Mapplethorpe a perfect
target for prosecution during the culture wars of the 1980s and 1990s.
I then analyze why, in spite of all these factors that made Mapplethorpe
the perfect target, the prosecution nonetheless led to an acquittal. Here
I argue that certain artistic aspects of the work made Mapplethorpe
surprisingly easy to defend under obscenity doctrine. Part III analyzes
the prosecution of two photographs of nude children included in the exhibition; I argue that these photographs now occupy a space of greater
legal and cultural uncertainty than they did thirty years ago. Part IV
argues that a fundamental mistake about artistic meaning underlay
the Mapplethorpe’s court’s pronouncements on the photographs as well
as common legal assumptions about the stability of artistic meaning. I
conclude that the dramatic changes in free speech law discussed in this
Article have been inextricably intertwined with and influenced by the
battles over social norms that the Mapplethorpe controversy unleashed.
I.

SCANDAL AND THE LANDMARK ART TRIAL

A. The Story of Mapplethorpe
Intertwined with Mapplethorpe’s legal legacy is a rich artistic and
cultural narrative. Mapplethorpe provoked political controversy, polarized critics, broke boundaries in the history of art and photography, and
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paved the way for a new generation of artists working today.4 Formally
perfect, sometimes radical in content, the work continues to capture the
attention of curators and collectors long after Mapplethorpe’s death
from AIDS in 1989 at age 42.
1.

The artist’s work

Mapplethorpe’s mature photographic work fell into three main categories: nudes, still lifes (particularly of flowers), and portraits. The
work that provoked Congress and prosecutors was a subset of nudes
that Mapplethorpe called the “sex pictures”;5 he also called them “smut
art.”6
The initial sex pictures were taken in a period from 1977–1980 and
depicted the gay male S&M community Mapplethorpe was actively participating in at the time, when he frequented New York clubs like the
Mineshaft.7 Mapplethorpe initially collected these images into a portfolio of thirteen photos called the X Portfolio. These photographs, some of
them showing hard-core, radical sex acts (as I will describe below), were
rarely exhibited in the U.S. during Mapplethorpe’s life, even as his fame
grew. The photos were often segregated from his main body of work despite Mapplethorpe’s attempt to integrate them into the corpus of his
art.8 For example, in one of their few showings during the artist’s life,
the sex pictures were displayed at the downtown avant-garde art space,
the Kitchen, while the same month in 1977, the more polished Holly
Solomon Gallery held an exhibit of Mapplethorpe’s regal and uncontroversial portraits.9

4

See PAUL MARTINEAU & BRITT SALVESEN, ROBERT MAPPLETHORPE: THE PHOTOGRAPHS
(Paul Martineau & Britt Salvesen eds., 2016). For an important analysis of the artistic significance
of Mapplethorpe’s work, see ARTHUR C. DANTO, PLAYING WITH THE EDGE: THE PHOTOGRAPHIC
ACHIEVEMENT OF ROBERT MAPPLETHORPE (1996).
5
Richard Meyer, Mapplethorped: Art, Photography, and the Pornographic Imagination, in
ROBERT MAPPLETHORPE: THE PHOTOGRAPHS 231, 237 (Paul Martineau & Britt Salvesen eds.,
2016).
6
Kevin Moore, Whipping Up a Storm: How Mapplethorpe Shocked America, GUARDIAN (Nov.
17, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2015/nov/17/robert-mapplethorpe-the-perfect-moment-25-years-later [https://perma.cc/389U-ESNK].
7
See Ryan Linkof, On the Edge, in ROBERT MAPPLETHORPE: THE PHOTOGRAPHS 55 (Paul
Martineau & Britt Salvesen eds., 2016). The X Portfolio contained the earliest of the sex pictures,
but Mapplethorpe continued to produce more.
8
Meyer, supra note 5; see also Moore, supra note 6.
9
Id.
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Robert Mapplethorpe, Jim, Sausalito (X Portfolio) (1977), the J. Paul
Getty Museum

Robert Mapplethorpe, X Portfolio (1978), the J. Paul Getty Museum
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The companion to the X Portfolio, produced at the same time, was
another collection of thirteen photos called the Y Portfolio. (Portfolio
collections in photography are a traditional method of assembling a
compendium of an artist’s work.) The Y Portfolio contained Mapplethorpe’s elegant, stylized pictures of flowers. Accompanying these two
was a third collection of thirteen photographs called the Z Portfolio,
which Mapplethorpe put together in 1981. It was comprised of images
of nude Black men, some of whom Mapplethorpe was artistically and
sexually involved with.10

Mapplethorpe, Carnation, N.Y.C. (Y Portfolio) (1978)

10

These images were ultimately published in a book called the Black Book. ROBERT
MAPPLETHORPE, BLACK BOOK (1988). For my discussion of the controversial racial politics of this
work, see infra Part IV.
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Mapplethorpe, Leigh Lee, N.Y.C. (Z Portfolio) (1980)

Mapplethorpe wanted the three portfolios ideally exhibited “all in
one mass”;11 in this way he highlighted the formal similarities between
the jarringly distinct subjects.12 In Cincinnati, where five of the X Portfolio pictures led to obscenity charges, the X, Y, and Z Portfolios were
displayed together in a grid like format.13
Mapplethorpe’s career soared in the late 1980s at roughly the same
time he grew ill from AIDS. A one-man show of his work opened in July
1988 at the Whitney Museum of American Art, marking a new level of
status and visibility in his career. That same year, a retrospective of his
work called The Perfect Moment was organized by the Institute of Contemporary Art (“ICA”) at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia. Opening in December 1988, it was set to travel to six more venues,
including Cincinnati, from 1989 to 1990.14 On March 9, 1989, Mapplethorpe died of AIDS at age 42.

11

Janet Kardon, Mapplethorpe Interview, in ROBERT MAPPLETHORPE: THE PERFECT MOMENT
28 (2d ed. 1989).
12
See Linkof, supra note 7, at 56. As Mapplethorpe commented, “I don’t think there’s that
much difference between a photograph of a fist up someone’s ass and a photograph of carnations
in a bowl.” Parker Hodges, ROBERT MAPPLETHORPE: PHOTOGRAPHER, Manhattan Gaze, Dec. 10.
1979–Jan. 6, 1980, at 5.
13
Richard Meyer, The Jesse Helms Theory of Art, 104 OCTOBER 131, 136 (2003). They were
installed on a tilted table too high for small children to see on their own. Id.
14
MARTINEAU & SALVESEN, supra note 4, at 7.
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The funding debates

Two months after Mapplethorpe’s death, politicians in the U.S.
Senate began an attack on the National Endowment for the Arts
(“NEA”) for its funding of controversial art. The initial focus was on another scandalous artist, Andres Serrano. Serrano’s work Piss Christ
was a picture of a crucifix submerged in the artists’ urine. Serrano had
been awarded a $15,000 prize by the Southeastern Center for Contemporary Art in North Carolina, which had received funding in part from
the NEA.15 Conservative members of Congress and an activist evangelical group, the American Family Association (headed by the Reverend
Don Wildmon), led the charge against the NEA for its funding choices.
In June 1989, shortly after Congress began its attack on the NEA,
and only a few months after Mapplethorpe’s death, The Perfect Moment
(the traveling Mapplethorpe retrospective that had originated at the
University of Pennsylvania’s ICA) was scheduled to open in Washington, D.C. at the Corcoran Gallery of Art. But in a startling act of selfcensorship, the director of the Corcoran cancelled the show—after all
the invitations had gone out—citing the escalating political debates
about art in Congress. Presumably the Corcoran curator was worried
about congressional attention because the ICA had received $30,000
from the NEA to support the exhibition and its catalogue.16 As is frequently the case with acts of self-censorship, the Corcoran’s decision to
cancel the show only served to draw further attention to Mapplethorpe’s
work.
Brandishing Mapplethorpe’s virtuosic and frankly sexual pictures
before Congress, conservative Senator Jesse Helms seized the moment.17 Helms pointed repeatedly to Mapplethorpe’s supposed “promotion of a homosexual lifestyle” and his death from AIDS. Although they
defeated Helms’s more radical proposal, an outraged Congress nonetheless amended the statutory rules governing NEA grants to deny funding
to “obscene” art; the law was later struck down as unconstitutionally
vague.18 After this legal defeat, Congress tried again, this time

15

See Cynthia Carr, Going to Extremes, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 20, 1990, at 67; Gregory B.
Lewis & Arthur C. Brooks, A Question of Morality: Artists’ Values and Public Funding for the Arts,
65 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 8 (2005).
16
NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS: A HISTORY, 1965–2008 93 (Mark Bauerlein & Ellen
Grantham eds., 2009).
17
Senator Helms denounced Mapplethorpe’s work as “filth” and “trash.” 135 CONG. REC.
S8807–08 (daily ed. July 26, 1989) (statement of Sen. Helms). See generally Owen M. Fiss, State
Activism and State Censorship, 100 YALE L.J. 2087, 2092 (1991).
18
Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101–121,
304(a), 103 Stat. 701, 741 (1989), invalidated by Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754
F. Supp. 774, 781–82 (C.D. Cal. 1991). The NEA chose not to appeal the decision. Nat’l Endowment
for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 575 (1998).
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amending the statute governing NEA grants to add a so-called “decency
rule.”19 The new language, upheld by the Supreme Court in NEA v. Finley,20 was passed in direct response to the Mapplethorpe and Serrano
controversies. It provided that in its grant-making decisions, the NEA
should take “into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public.”21 Mapplethorpe had become the poster child for what conservatives claimed
was a culturally elite art world that mocked American values.22
3.

The trial

It was in this hostile political climate that The Perfect Moment was
set to open in Cincinnati at the Contemporary Arts Center (“CAC”).
Amidst political pressure, the museum sought to steel itself against attack; it segregated any general federal funds it received from the Mapplethorpe show, placed warning signs for visitors, and did not admit
anyone under 18 to the exhibition.23 Approximately 80,000 people saw
the show.24 On March 22, 1990, the CAC sought a declaratory judgment
that the work was not obscene. The show opened on April 7, 1990 and
was met on its first day with a grand jury indictment. Mapplethorpe
was dead, but the museum and its director, Dennis Barrie, were
charged with violating obscenity law as well as an Ohio law prohibiting
nude depictions of children. Seven of the show’s 175 pictures were on
trial.25 Barrie faced up to one year in jail.26
The prosecution’s main case was to present the photos and the testimony of three police offers who established that the photos were displayed at CAC. The defense presented four days of expert testimony,
19

20 U.S.C. 954(d) (1994).
524 U.S. 569 (1998) (rejecting a claim that the law was impermissible viewpoint discrimination and unconstitutionally vague). For discussion of Finley, see Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., NEA
v. Finley: A Decision in Search of a Rationale, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1999); Kristine M. Cunnane,
Maintaining Viewpoint Neutrality for the NEA: National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 31
CONN. L. REV. 1445 (1999); Cara Putman, National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley: The Supreme Court Missed an Opportunity to Clarify the Role of the NEA in Funding the Arts: Are the
Grants A Property Right or an Award, 9 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 237, 242 (1999).
21
20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1990).
22
Robert Reid-Pharr, Putting Mapplethorpe in His Place, ART IN AM. (Mar. 2016), https://ww
w.gladstonegallery.com/sites/default/files/MAP-2016_03%20Art%20in%20America.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LT66-HAK].
23
STEVEN C. DUBIN, ARRESTING IMAGES: IMPOLITIC ART AND UNCIVIL ACTIONS 184–85 (1992).
24
Id.
25
The five pictures that were alleged to be obscene were as follows: One shows a man urinating into another man’s mouth; another called Lou, N.Y.C. shows a finger inserted into a penis.
Three more each depict a man with an object inserted in the rectum: a cylinder, a bull whip (this
is a self-portrait), and a man’s fist and forearm. Fiss, supra note 17 at 2089 n.4.
26
The CAC faced a $10,000 fine. DUSTIN KIDD, LEGISLATING CREATIVITY: THE INTERSECTIONS
OF ART & POLITICS 71 (2016).
20
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largely from art critics and curators.27 After a jury trial, the defendants
were acquitted.28 The trial gripped the art world, turning Mapplethorpe
into a cause célèbre and a symbol of the threat posed by the culture wars
to artistic and sexual freedom.29
B. “Mapplethorpe Fever”:30 The Resurgent Interest in the Work
There has been a resurgence of interest in Mapplethorpe in recent
years. A younger generation of curators has engaged with his legacy,
and his status as an art market star has risen. Over the last few years
critics have chronicled the art world’s “growing obsession” with the artist.31 One critic declared that the art world has been gripped with a case
of “Mapplethorpe fever.”32 Vogue Magazine termed it “Mapplethorpe
mania.”33 Certainly museums have been lavishing attention on his
work. Two major museums recently collaborated on a joint retrospective
of Mapplethorpe’s oeuvre; Robert Mapplethorpe: The Perfect Medium
spanned both the J. Paul Getty Museum and LACMA (the Los Angeles
County Museum of Art).34 A documentary about his work and the scandal surrounding it debuted to critical acclaim in 2016.35 The Guggenheim staged a major one-year, two-part Mapplethorpe retrospective in
2019.
Mapplethorpe’s star is also rising in the art market. An image from
the X Portfolio broke a new auction record for that series in 2015.36 The
auction was for one of his most controversial—and highly regarded—
explicit images, Man in a Polyester Suit, depicting the artist’s lover,
27

DUBIN, supra note 24, at 188–89.
Mary T. Schmich, Art Gallery, Director Not Guilty: Cincinnati Jurors Clear Both of Obscenity Charges, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 6, 1990, at 1; see also Sonya G. Bonneau, Ex Post Modernism: How
the First Amendment Framed Nonrepresentational Art, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 195, 219 (2015).
29
Paul Martineau & Britt Salvesen, Introduction, in ROBERT MAPPLETHORPE: THE
PHOTOGRAPHS 1,7 (Paul Martineau & Britt Salvesen eds., 2016).
30
Embuscado, supra note 1.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Julia Felsenthal, Mapplethorpe Mania Hits Los Angeles, VOGUE (Mar. 16, 2016), https://w
ww.vogue.com/article/robert-mapplethorpe-the-perfect-medium-interview [https://perma.cc/8L9VCWLT].
34
See J. PAUL GETTY MUSEUM, supra note 2; LOS ANGELES CTY. MUSEUM OF ART, supra note
2.
35
James Poniewozik, Review: ‘Mapplethorpe: Look at the Pictures’ on HBO Gives Context to
Controversy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/04/arts/television/review
-mapplethorpe-look-at-the-pictures-on-hbo-gives-context-to-controversy.html [https://perma.cc/5B
VE-YUT6].
36
The Sotheby’s sale marked “the first time in 23 years that one of the 15 images from the
original edition of X Portfolio” came up at auction. Sarah Cascone, Robert Mapplethorpe’s Controversial ‘Man in Polyester Suit’ Photo Sells for $478,000, ARTNET NEWS (Oct. 8, 2015),
https://news.artnet.com/market/robert-mapplethorpe-polyester-suit-sells-338631
[https://perma.cc/7JKN-N3KG].
28
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Milton Moore, wearing a three-piece suit with his penis exposed and his
head unseen. This image, once denounced in Congress, sold for
$478,000.37 (The photograph was one of an edition of fifteen.) The last
time the work sold publicly was in 1992, when it brought $9,000.38
II. DOES OBSCENITY LAW STILL MATTER?
Until Mapplethorpe, there had never been an obscenity prosecution
against an art museum in the history of this country. Obscenity law was
haunted by the specter of having banned great works of literature, but
never significant works of art. In its first obscenity decision in 1957,
Roth v. United States,39 the Supreme Court entered with some trepidation a doctrinal arena marked by a history of literary philistinism. Prior
to the Court’s intervention, lower courts had overseen the suppression
(and, later, the eventual freeing) of acclaimed books such as James
Joyce’s Ulysses and D.H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover.40 Writing
his concurrence in Roth, the Court’s first foray into the field, Chief Justice Warren evoked obscenity law’s historic suppression of “great” cultural works,41 referring to the “[m]istakes of the past.”42
And indeed, those mistakes had become a thing of the past by the
time the Mapplethorpe case came to trial in 1990. Although the
37

Daniel McDermon, Mapplethorpe Photograph Brings $478,000 at Auction, N.Y. TIMES:
ARTSBEAT BLOG (Oct. 7, 2015, 3:26 PM), https://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/mappleth
orpe-photograph-brings-478000-at-auction/ [https://perma.cc/E9DD-PUM3]. While this was the
record for a work from Mapplethorpe’s X Portfolio, an earlier record for all of Mapplethorpe’s images was set at Christie’s in 2006, when his 1987 portrait of Andy Warhol sold for $643,200. See
Stephen Milioti, Despite Record Prices for Photographs at This Year’s Auctions, it is Still Cheaper
to Corner the Market in Leibovitz than Lichtenstein. Here’s How to Get Started, FORTUNE (Nov. 17,
2006), https://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/11/13/8393128/index.
htm [https://perma.cc/9RJJ-K267]. In 2017, a Mapplethorpe self-portrait sold for £450,000
(£548,750 with fees). Anna Brady, Auction Record for Mapplethorpe as Christie’s Introduces Two
New Sales, ART NEWSPAPER (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.theartnewspaper.com/news/christies [htt
ps://perma.cc/DRJ3-8WB7].
38
Id.
39
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Prior to Roth, the Court had heard an obscenity
case but split four-to-four and thus did not issue an opinion. The result was to affirm a state court
obscenity judgment against noted critic Edmund Wilson’s novel, Memoirs of Hecate County. Doubleday & Co. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948). Thus, the Court was itself implicated in this history
of failure. It had failed to protect a novel by one of the most prominent cultural critics of the day.
40
See United States v. One Book Called “Ulysses,” 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (allowing
the entry of Ulysses into the United States after previous censorship); Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (overturning, under the Roth standard, the Postmaster
of New York’s suppression of Grove Press’s unexpurgated edition of Lady Chatterley’s Lover).
41
The Chief Justice wrote: “The history of the application of laws designed to suppress the
obscene demonstrates convincingly that the power of government can be invoked under them
against great art or literature, scientific treatises, or works exciting social controversy.” Roth, 354
U.S. at 495 (Warren, C.J., concurring in result). Cf. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 178–79 (1982) (noting obscenity regulation’s history of plain errors in
banning what we now consider great cultural works).
42
Roth, 354 U.S. at 495 (Warren, J., concurring).

1]

RETHINKING ROBERT MAPPLETHORPE

13

Supreme Court had struggled mightily during the years between its
first major obscenity decision and its last in 1973,43 its goal had been to
ban “‘hard-core’ pornography”44 while at the same time protecting
works of cultural import.45 By 1973, when the Court finally agreed on
the modern definition of obscenity, it looked as if it had settled on a
formula that achieved both goals and that would ward off another cultural embarrassment. Then came Mapplethorpe.
The current definition of obscenity, crafted by the Court in 1973 in
Miller v. California, allows the government to ban material only if the
work, taken as a whole and according to contemporary community
standards:46
(a) “appeals to the prurient interest;”
(b) “depicts [sexual conduct] in a patently offensive way . . . ;
and”
(c) “lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.”47
All three prongs must be met before a work can be held obscene and
thus banished from First Amendment protection. This means that no
matter how sexually explicit—even disgusting—it may be, if a work
possesses “serious . . . artistic . . . value,” it is protected.48 Although one
might presume this standard would protect automatically any work

43

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Although it was a significant case in terms of its
clarification of Miller’s third prong, the Court’s decision in Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987), did
not change the basic definition or the rationale of obscenity law, both of which have remained in
place since Miller and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 97 (1973) were decided in 1973.
44
The Court specified in 1973 that only “‘hard core’ pornography” should be banned under the
obscenity test, Miller, 413 U.S. at 28, but failed to give a definition for the term. The phrase had
appeared before in obscenity jurisprudence, including in Justice Stewart’s famous opinion stating
that he understood obscenity law to encompass only “hard-core pornography.” Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). Yet as for the definition of
that phrase, he wrote, “I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description, and perhaps I could never succeed in
intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it . . . .” Id.
45
This angst of the Court’s struggle over the years is palpable in the cases: Chief Justice
Burger referred the somewhat “tortured history” of the Court’s obscenity cases. Miller, 413 U.S. at
19. Justice Harlan, terming the obscenity problem “intractable,” observed that it had “produced a
variety of views among the members of the Court unmatched in any other course of constitutional
adjudication.” Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46
In Pope, 481 U.S. at 500–01, the Court explained that the community standards analysis
did not apply to the third prong of the test for value.
47
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted). Note that the third prong is judged from the
perspective of the reasonable person rather than an “average person” in a community. Pope, 481
U.S. at 500–01.
48
Id. at 34.
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displayed in a major U.S. museum, that presumption turned out to be
wrong.
The Mapplethorpe case marked the return of obscenity law’s repressed history of banning works of cultural value, the very problem
that modern obscenity jurisprudence was designed to combat.49 What
was it about Mapplethorpe’s work that destabilized the Court’s project?
And what was it about Mapplethorpe that led to a new chapter in this
history of cultural attacks, provoking the first obscenity trial against an
art museum in the history of the U.S.?
The answer has to do with the nature of Mapplethorpe’s work and
the dramatic changes in the meaning of “art” that it signaled. But it
also has to do with a problem that had been brewing undetected in obscenity law for some time: its fundamental clash with a sweeping shift
that was taking place in art.
A. Mapplethorpe’s Scandalous Subject Matter
First consider the obvious reason why Mapplethorpe’s work provoked this unprecedented trial: some of his images were so controversial and provocative, particularly for their time, that the prosecution
seemed preordained. Mapplethorpe depicted sadomasochistic, sometimes violent, hard-core sex acts between gay men. For example, one of
the prosecuted pictures showed a man fisting another man, his hand
and wrist inserted into the other’s anus. Another picture depicted a
leather-clad man urinating into the mouth of another man, who kneels
to accept it. Even by today’s standards, thirty years later, in which pornography,50 not to mention homosexuality,51 have become
49

This had been in some ways Chief Justice Brennan’s core project in Roth, when he wrote
that all works of value were to be protected. But the Court’s project was not fully successful in
guiding lower courts. For example, it took an appeal all the way to the Supreme Court to save the
well-reviewed, popular film Carnal Knowledge, which had been held obscene by the Georgia Supreme Court. See Jenkins v. Georgia 418 U.S. 153 (1974). The Supreme Court, while noting the
film’s positive reviews, relied not on its value but on its lack of extreme sexual content to invalidate
the conviction under the First Amendment. The Court did not apply Miller’s serious value prong
to the film; rather, it based its holding on the first two prongs of Miller. Nonetheless, the Court did
describe the film’s favorable reviews and critical acclaim. Id. at 158, 158 n.5.
50
See Amy Adler, All Porn All the Time, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 695 (2007) (writing
about the mainstreaming of porn); see also, Amy Adler, What Happened to the Feminist Critique
of Pornography? 19 – 25 (2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). A curator for
one of the recent retrospectives commented on the changing cultural values that allowed her to
hang the X Portfolio pictures with less controversy. She spoke of the “greater acceptance of explicitly sexual work” in the U.S. Helen Stoilas, Who’s Afraid of Mapplethorpe, ART NEWSPAPER (Mar.
15, 2016), http://theartnewspaper.com/news/museums/mapplethorpe-in-la/ [https://perma.cc/WR8
Z-TKBF].
51
On changing views about homosexuality: If Supreme Court law is any guide to cultural
values, one only need look at the trajectory from Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (decided
four years before the Mapplethorpe case and approving the criminalization of homosexual sodomy),
overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), to Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015)
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comparatively mainstream, some of the S&M pictures are hard to look
at.52 One Mapplethorpe picture, for example, not included in the Cincinnati exhibit, depicts a bleeding penis (after having been grazed by a
knife), clamped in a bondage device.53
But in contrast to how we see them today, these images carried a
radically different meaning thirty years ago. They were shown at the
height of the AIDS crisis and the “culture wars”54 that were raging in
post-Reagan America. Homophobia and AIDS panic were rampant. Homosexual sodomy was criminal, with the Supreme Court’s approval.55
Gay men were politically reviled as they were being ravaged by an epidemic. Panic over the possibility that one could be contaminated just by
touching gay men was so great that police sometimes wore rubber
gloves during AIDS activist protests.56 Conservative writer William F.
Buckley had argued that people with AIDS should be mandatorily tattooed.57 Mapplethorpe had died from AIDS a year before the exhibition
opened in Cincinnati; he documented his illness in his art.58 And his
work was received as if the pictures themselves were polluted with the
contaminating threat of the disease. As critics have noted, “the spectre
of death” hung over the photos; “the information that Mapplethorpe
died of AIDS [was] always available.”59 Members of Congress continually spoke of Mapplethorpe’s disease as they denounced funding for his
(finding a constitutional right to gay marriage), to observe the growing mainstream and judicial
acceptance of homosexuality.
52
See, e.g., Moore, supra note 6 (“If today the X Portfolio pictures are hard to look at (and they
still are), it has more to do with the violence than the sexuality.”).
53
Linkof, supra note 7, at 56 (describing Mapplethorpe’s Dick, N.Y.C. (1978)); cf. MIRA SCHOR,
WET: ON PAINTING, FEMINISM, AND ART CULTURE 28 (1997) (describing the photograph Richard
(1978), a diptych of a penis strapped into a wooden contraption, splattered with blood in the second
frame).
54
For a discussion of the culture wars and other artists who were targeted during the period,
see CULTURE WARS: DOCUMENTS FROM THE RECENT CONTROVERSIES IN THE ARTS (Richard Bolton
ed., 1992); JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991);
MARJORIE HEINS, SEX, SIN, AND BLASPHEMY: A GUIDE TO AMERICA’S CENSORSHIP WARS (1993) (describing numerous cases of attacks on art); Amy Adler, The Thirty-Ninth Annual Edward G. Donley Memorial Lectures: The Art of Censorship, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 205, 206–07 (2000). For an historical account of controversial art, see MICHAEL G. KAMMEN, VISUAL SHOCK: A HISTORY OF ART
CONTROVERSIES IN AMERICAN CULTURE (2006).
55
See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190–191. Although the Court upheld criminalization of all sodomy
(heterosexual and homosexual), the opinion focused on gay sex. But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers).
56
Joe B. Warrick, Researcher: Police Should Use Gloves, Masks in Handling AIDS Victims,
UPI, Oct. 12, 1987 (describing police as “panic-stricken”).
57
William F. Buckley, Opinion, Crucial Steps in Combating the AIDS Epidemic; Identify All
the Carriers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 1986), http://movies2.nytimes.com/books/00/07/16/specials/buck
ley-aids.html [https://perma.cc/HT7P-LM6H].
58
One of the most shocking photographs in the exhibition was Mapplethorpe’s frank self-portrait of his AIDS-ravaged, skeletal face, his hand gripping a cane with a skull, reproduced on
page 2.
59
Ingrid Sischy, Photography: White and Black, NEW YORKER, Nov. 13, 1989, at 124, 138–39.
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work. Senator Helms, for example, calling Mapplethorpe’s work “homosexual pornography,” said Mapplethorpe “died of AIDS while spending
the last years of his life promoting homosexuality.”60
Further adding fuel to the fire, the works were tinged with the frisson of interracial sex. Many of Mapplethorpe’s most famous portraits
were of eroticized, nude Black men; some photos depicted interracial
couples. Senator Helms highlighted the interracial theme in his attack
on Mapplethorpe. Helms denounced a picture (that did not exist, oddly,
other than in his imagination) of “two males of different races” in an
erotic pose “on a marble-top table” as evidence of the artist’s depravity.61
(In Part IV, infra, I turn directly to the complex issue of race in Mapplethorpe’s work.)
Though the heady combination of race, homosexuality, pornography, AIDS-panic, and violent sadomasochistic practices was already
enough to provoke controversy, an additional factor upped the ante: the
fact that the photos were presented in highly classicized style and displayed with the imprimatur of “art” in a museum made them even more
galling to conservative critics. Indeed, as explained above, the photos
helped launch a national debate about government funding for the arts.
Congress found in Mapplethorpe a perfect symbol of what it viewed as
the perverse, menacing art world, thumbing its nose at mainstream values.
Thus it’s hard to imagine a more perfect target for prosecutors
wishing to win an obscenity prosecution in 1990: an unpopular speaker,
targeted by Congress as a contagious pervert, whose work depicted unpopular practices that tapped into national dread, hatred, and paranoia. As explained above, under the Miller standard for obscenity, a
conviction under obscenity law requires a prosecutor to prove three
prongs.62 The first two prongs seem like no-brainers for a win against
these images in 1990 America (in a conservative Midwestern city no
less). Under the first prong, the government must prove that a work
appeals to the “prurient”—meaning “shameful or morbid”—interest.63
Under the second prong of Miller, the government must show that the
work is “patently offensive” according to “contemporary community

60

135 CONG. REC. S12111 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1989) (statement of Sen. Helms); see also id. at
H3640–41 (daily ed. July 12, 1989) (statement of Rep. Dannemeyer) (noting Mapplethorpe’s death
from AIDS, and calling him a “homosexual activist[ ]”).
61
Helms quoted in Maureen Dowd, Unruffled Helms Basks in Eye of Arts Storm, N.Y. TIMES
(July 28, 1989), https://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/28/arts/unruffled-helms-basks-in-eye-of-arts-st
orm.html [https://perma.cc/R65J-BPUX].
62
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973).
63
See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957) (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957)); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U. S. 491, 497 (1985).
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standards.”64 Both inquiries seem designed to suppress representations
of sexual practices that deviate from the mainstream—and perfectly
tailored for Mapplethorpe. For example, in discussing the meaning of
prurience, the Supreme Court had previously let stand a lower court
interpretation that defined prurience as the opposite of “a good, oldfashioned, healthy” interest in sex.65 Prurience thus depends on a dichotomy between “shameful or morbid” desire on the one hand, and
“good old-fashioned, healthy” sexuality on the other. In 1990 America,
it seems clear that Mapplethorpe’s sex pictures would have fallen on
the wrong side of that line.
Indeed, the defense all but conceded that it would lose on the first
two prongs of the Miller test.66 The case seemed like an easy win for the
prosecution. Mapplethorpe’s work was a perfect lightning rod for the
sexual and cultural tumult that was sweeping America. But there was
a third prong of the test that would prove pivotal to the case: was Mapplethorpe’s work “serious art”?
B. The Clash between Obscenity Law and Postmodern Art
Beyond the almost ludicrously controversial subject matter of the
work for its time, I believe there was another reason the prosecution of
Mapplethorpe’s work was preordained. In my view, the crisis of Mapplethorpe was built into the structure of obscenity law itself and its
clash with a dramatic change in artistic practice that had been brewing,
unnoticed, as the Court crafted its modern definition of obscenity in
1973. Obscenity law was built on the very assumption that contemporary artists like Mapplethorpe had begun to question as a central tenet
of their work: that there was a distinction between pornography and
art. The fusion of pornography and art that Mapplethorpe championed
was not a peripheral practice but instead central to a deeper transition
in art that was underway just as Miller was decided.
The Miller standard for obscenity law, discussed above, had diminished the constitutional protection the Court had afforded art in its previous obscenity cases. The Court’s prior obscenity test (upheld by only
a plurality) had protected any work, no matter how filthy, prurient, or
offensive, unless it was “utterly without redeeming social value.”67 This
was the famous language that had protected the novel Fanny Hill in

64
65
66

Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
Brockett, 472 U.S. at 499 (citations omitted).
See Marc Mezibov, The Mapplethorpe Obscenity Trial, LITIGATION, Summer 1992, at 12–

20, 71.
67

nal).

Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966) (plurality opinion) (emphasis in origi-
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1966.68 Miller rejected this expansive test in favor of a standard that
protected less art and was easier for the prosecution to meet.69 A work
of art now needed to possess “serious artistic value” to gain protection.
As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent to Miller’s companion case,
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton:
The Court’s approach necessarily assumes that some works will
be deemed obscene—even though they clearly have some social
value—because the State was able to prove that the value, measured by some unspecified standard, was not sufficiently “serious” to warrant constitutional protection. That result is . . . an
invitation to widespread suppression of sexually oriented
speech.70
The problem is that this legal retrenchment occurred at a radical turning point in the history of art: the rise of “postmodernism.” The changes
in art that were brewing at the time of Miller would ultimately render
the new standard even less protective of art than Justice Brennan had
feared.71 This is because the “serious artistic value” test etched in stone
the precise standard against which art was beginning to rebel in 1973.
As I have argued elsewhere and as I explain below, Miller was premised
on the reigning, but soon to crumble, vision of art in mid-century America, the period called “Modernism.”72
Miller’s protection only for art that demonstrated “serious value”
would have made perfect sense in mid-century America. As I have argued, a particular form of modernism, “late modernism,” which had triumphed in the 1950s and 1960s, was foundational to Miller. 73 It may be
hard for us in our era of critical and artistic pluralism to imagine the
cultural penetration once attained by one artistic school of thought.74
68

Id.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 22 (interpreting prior obscenity cases as creating “a burden virtually
impossible to discharge” for prosecution).
70
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 97 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71
Amy Adler, Post-Modern Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1359 (1990).
This Part draws significantly from that piece, which argues that the Miller standard enshrined in
obscenity law the precise vision of art that so many artists rebelled against in the 1970s and 1980s
as postmodernism took hold and that Miller thus introduced into obscenity law a standard that
was deeply incompatible with the new art that was emerging when it was drafted. Id.
72
Id.
73
See, e.g., PETER HALLEY, Against Post-Modernism: Reconsidering Ortega, in COLLECTED
ESSAYS 1981–1987, at 27 (1988). Note that critic Michael Fried also held enormous sway over art
in this period.
74
Perhaps the closest contemporary analogue to Greenberg might be one of the powerful art
dealers, such as Gagosian or Zwirner. But in spite of their power in the market (and the market’s
power over museums), there is still no modern figure who exerts the kind of critical power Greenberg did. The rebellion against his vision was a success but is still a testament to his pervasive
reach.
69
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But in mid-century America, late modernism, particularly as articulated by its leading critic, Clement Greenberg, was so dominant that a
recent scholar described Greenberg as having ruled the mid-century art
world with a “papal authority.”75
The period of late modernism as articulated by Greenberg (and his
peers) was a purist movement.76 Greenberg believed that art could
“maintain its past standards of excellence”77 by using the “characteristic methods of a discipline to criticize the discipline itself—not in order
to subvert it, but to entrench it more firmly in its area of competence.”78
Late modernism distinguished between good art and bad art by demanding that good art be pure, self-critical, original, sincere, and serious.79
The standard of “serious artistic value” seems perfectly designed to
protect the art we most valued in the late modernist era. As an art critic
wrote of modernism, “the highest accolade that could be paid to any
artist was this: ‘serious.’”80 It is as if the word “serious” were a code word
for modernist values: critics consistently equate it with the modernist
stance.81 In fact, the very foundation of Miller, the belief that some art
is just not good enough or serious enough to be worthy of protection,
mirrors the modernist notion that distinctions could be drawn between
good art and bad, and that the value of art was objectively verifiable.82
Yet the Court devised the Miller test for “serious artistic value” in
1973, precisely the time that modernism in art was entering its death
throes. Miller represented one of the last gasps of this crumbling but
still powerful modernist zeitgeist. One year earlier, the art critic Leo
Steinberg had been perhaps the first to apply the name “post-modernism” to the revolutionary shift in art that was emerging just as Miller
was decided.83 The emerging postmodern ethos took aim at each of the
75

Barry Gewen, State of the Art, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2005, § 7, at 28 (quoting art historian
Robert Rosenblum).
76
See, e.g., Clement Greenberg, Modernist Painting, in MODERN ART AND MODERNISM: A
CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 6 (Francis Frascina & Charles Harrison eds., 1982) (“[A]rt . . . in its ‘purity’
[would] find the guarantee of its standards of quality.”).
77
Id. at 10.
78
Id. at 5.
79
Clement Greenberg wrote in 1955, “There is good and bad in [contemporary painting],
and . . . the difference . . . owes its realization to a severer discipline . . . .” Clement Greenberg,
“American-Type” Painting, in MODERN ART AND MODERNISM 94 (Francis Frascina & Charles Harrison eds., 1982); see also CLEMENT GREENBERG, Avant-Garde and Kitsch, in ART AND CULTURE:
CRITICAL ESSAYS 3 (1961) (finding value in high art but not in kitsch).
80
Douglas Davis, Post-Performancism, ARTFORUM, Oct. 1981, at 31, 39.
81
See, e.g., Thomas Crow, These Collectors, They Talk about Baudrillard Now, in Discussions,
in CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 1 (Hal Foster ed., 1987).
82
See, e.g., BRIAN WALLIS, What’s Wrong with This Picture?, in ART AFTER MODERNISM:
RETHINKING REPRESENTATION xii (Brian Wallis ed., 1984).
83
LEO STEINBERG, Other Criteria, in OTHER CRITERIA: CONFRONTATIONS WITH TWENTIETH-
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Greenbergian precepts I catalogued above. Artists attacked basic modernist distinctions: between good art and bad, between high art and
popular culture, between the sanctity of the art context and real life.
Artists not only questioned the modernist demand that art be “serious,”
many made work that also questioned the idea that art must have any
traditional “value” at all.
One of many ways that artists attacked these assumptions was to
incorporate pornography into their art. The introduction of this debased
vernacular into the realm of high art disrupted the modernist norms
that undergirded the serious artistic value standard. In some ways, this
disruption was the essence of Mapplethorpe’s practice. He insisted “I
can make pornography art.”84 Mashing up “fine art photography and
the commercial sex industry,” Mapplethorpe was “scrambling aesthetic
categories and genres” that had previously been understood to be “mutually exclusive.”85 According to one critic, this was the major contribution of Mapplethorpe’s work: his incorporation of the pornographic led
to a “redrawing of the boundary line of the aesthetic to include that
which had previously been excluded from it.”86 By making what he
called “smut art,” his work undermined the foundation on which the
Miller test and obscenity law were founded: that we can separate the
pornographic from the artistic and valuable.
C. Why Art Won: An Assessment
How on earth did the Mapplethorpe defense win given all this?
Mapplethorpe’s shocking subject matter rendered prongs one and two
of the Miller test forgone losers. Prong three, protecting works of “serious artistic value,” depended on the precise late modernist view of art
that Mapplethorpe’s work challenged.
Yet, surprisingly, while certain characteristics of his photography
made Mapplethorpe an inevitable obscenity law target thirty years ago,
other qualities of his work help explain why the prosecution resulted in
an acquittal. Indeed, I want to assert that in some ways, the Mapplethorpe case was easy to defend. In spite of his shocking subject matter,
on a formal level, Mapplethorpe’s work looked thoroughly and undeniably like art. In fact, it was conventional, even old-fashioned. He was
an accomplished and elegant photographer. Formally beautiful, rich
with art historical allusions to the classical tradition (from Greek
CENTURY ART 91 (1972).
84
See Kardon, supra note 11.
85
See Meyer, supra note 5.
86
Jonathan D. Katz, Robert Mapplethorpe’s Queer Classicism: The Substance of Style, in
ROBERT MAPPLETHORPE: THE PHOTOGRAPHS 257, 258 (Paul Martineau & Britt Salvesen eds.,
2016).
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sculpture to Caravaggio to nineteenth century portraiture), his meticulously printed work highlighted his classicized use of light and composition.87 (The images below give a glimpse of these qualities.) Calling
attention to their formal artistry, the photographs are tasteful, even
traditional; his use of black and white (rather than the popular color
photography at the time) signaled restrained classicism and old-fashioned assumptions about what art was meant to look like. At the time,
street photography like Gary Winogrand’s had captured the attention
of critics, in contrast to Mapplethorpe’s more traditional staged studio
photographs.88 It was easy to describe Mapplethorpe’s photos as “art”—
if you stopped looking at the subject matter and looked only at their
formal qualities.89

Hippolyte Flandrin, Study (1835-6)

87

Mapplethorpe, Ajitto (1981)90

Nonetheless, one should remember that Mapplethorpe’s use of photography as his medium,
rather than painting or sculpture, was in tension with this classicizing effect. He was creating the
work at a time when photography was still not fully accepted as a high art form. In some ways,
Mapplethorpe work thus explored the marginalization of photography from high art, just as it
explored the more extreme marginalization of smut. For a discussion of photography’s contested
status as art, see SUSAN SONTAG, ON PHOTOGRAPHY 115 (1977).
88
See DANTO, supra note 4, at 24–29 (contrasting Mapplethorpe with Winogrand).
89
It is important to note that many people within the art world did not take his work seriously
and still don’t. In contrast to Danto’s assessment, others dismiss Mapplethorpe as commercial and
slick, a mere “fashion photographer.” See, e.g., Arthur Lubow, Has Robert Mapplethorpe’s Moment
Passed?, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/25/arts/design/robert-mapplethorpe-guggenheim.html [https://perma.cc/8HQ7-WRNP]; DANTO, supra note 4, at 104 (describing the work and particularly its beauty as making it “somewhat suspect in the eyes of the art
world”).
90
The photographer Wilhelm von Gloeden liberally quoted from Flandrin’s painting in his
1902 photograph Caino that was likely a source for Mapplethorpe.
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Mapplethorpe, Jim (1980)

Contrast his work with other artists from the same era who were
also disrupting the boundaries between obscenity and art. For example,
consider Karen Finley, a later target of the culture wars, who brought
the Supreme Court challenge to the very NEA amendments that Congress had passed in response to the Mapplethorpe scandal.91 In contrast
to Mapplethorpe, Finley produced performance art that may have been
hard to categorize as “art” at all, particularly for a generation accustomed to paintings and sculpture as the paradigmatic art forms. Famously smearing her nude body with yams, screaming about sex acts,
performing in art venues but also bars, Finley dispensed with traditional markers of “art.” A signature Finley piece was called Yams Up
My Granny’s Ass.92 Compared to Finley’s art, Mapplethorpe’s work was
formally traditional and even conservative; its shock derived from the
tension between its high art presentation and its untraditional content.

91

Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
For discussion of this piece, its gender politics, and the conservative reaction to Finley’s art,
see DAVIDA BLOOM, RAPE, RAGE AND FEMINISM IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN DRAMA 108–09
(2015).
92
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Karen Finley Performance

Or consider Jeff Koons’s merger of art and porn, his Made in
Heaven series from 1989 that was exhibited in New York shortly after
the Mapplethorpe trial. In some ways, Mapplethorpe’s work strikes me
as easier to defend on an obscenity charge than Koons’s would have
been if challenged at the time. In contrast to Mapplethorpe’s work,
Made in Heaven used the vernacular of porn without any trappings of
art. Koons produced the series by posing with his then-wife, the porn
star Cicciolina. The images of the couple were shot not by the “artist”
but by Cicciolina’s usual porn photographer, using the sets and the accoutrements of porn, complete with lurid, tacky backdrops. Like much
of Koons’s art, the work looked garish, kitschy, and lowly; it reveled in
its lack of conventional markers of high art.93 And, like Mapplethorpe’s,
the work included hard-core images, such as a close up of anal sex. Of
course, though some of the work was hard-core, Koons was still more
insulated from prosecution or conviction than Mapplethorpe in the
sense that he was engaging in heterosexual sex acts—with his wife no
less. Even so, the work still has the capacity to shock; in the 2014

93

For a discussion of this series, see SCOTT ROTHKOPF, No Limits, in JEFF KOONS: A
RETROSPECTIVE 15, 24–25 (2014); see also, Michael Kimmelman, Art in Review, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
29, 1991, at C28 (reviewing the Made in Heaven show); Calvin Tomkins, Koons at Fifty, NEW
YORKER, Feb. 7, 2005, at 33 (discussing the Made in Heaven show in the context of Koons’s other
work).
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retrospective of Koons’s work, the Whitney displayed this series (other
than the billboard, pictured below) in a separate room from the rest of
the exhibition, complete with warning signs about its content.

Jeff Koons, Made in Heaven (1989)

Thus, compared to other artists who were incorporating sex into
their work at the time, I think Mapplethorpe’s work was relatively easy
to defend under Miller’s third prong. The old-fashioned formalism of
Mapplethorpe’s work, coupled with obscenity law’s requirement of “serious . . . artistic . . . value” explains the sometimes laughable testimony that emerged at the trial. In my experience, contemporary art
world professionals sometimes seem perplexed by the tenor taken by
some experts for the defense in 1990.94 For example, consider the almost
ludicrously formalist testimony of Janet Kardon, the curator who had
organized the Mapplethorpe show for the ICA. Describing Mapplethorpe’s self-portrait with a bullwhip inserted into his anus, Kardon ignored the sexual content, testifying about its “classical” composition by
focusing on the placement of the horizon line.95 When asked to comment
on another photographs from the X Portfolio, depicting a finger shoved
into a man’s penis, Kardon said, “It’s a central image, very symmetrical,
a very ordered, classical composition.”96 Symmetry and composition are

94

Moore, supra note 6.
HOLLIDAY T. DAY, POWER: ITS MYTHS AND MORES IN AMERICAN ART 1961–1991 113 (1991).
96
Andy Grundberg, Critic’s Notebook; Cincinnati Trial’s Unanswered Question, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 8, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/18/arts/critic-s-notebook-cincinnati-trial-s-unans
wered-question.html [https://perma.cc/RZS5-ZB3V]; see also Isabel Wilkerson, Clashes at Obscenity Trial on What an Eye Really Sees, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/10
/03/us/clashes-at-obscenity-trial-on-what-an-eye-really-sees.html [https://perma.cc/7AZU-6G7K].
At another point, discussing the photograph Jim and Tom, Sausalito, in which one leather-clad
man urinates into another’s mouth, Kardon emphasized the “opposing diagonals” of the lines
95
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not exactly the first things one thinks about when viewing this image.
A critic at the time called such testimony “disingenuous.”97 A more recent critic labelled Kardon’s emphasis on formal qualities of the work
“bizarre.”98 But Kardon’s peculiar testimony was rooted directly in the
requirements of the Miller test, and in the truth of Mapplethorpe’s classicized work. That classicism, plus Mapplethorpe’s rising fame and
emerging blue-chip museum status, made his case relatively easy to defend under Miller, at least compared to many of his peers, who were
defying the standard of serious artistic value in a way that made their
work seem almost unrecognizable as “art.”
D. The Decline of Obscenity Law
How significant a threat is obscenity law to art in a post-Mapplethorpe world? Not very—for two reasons. First, as I will explain, obscenity law has all but died as a prosecutorial tool.99 Second, and relatedly, the merger between art and pornography that Mapplethorpe and
his compatriots championed has receded as a theme in contemporary
art.
In the 1990s, for a number of reasons I have explored elsewhere,
obscenity law began to fall into relative disuse.100 One main reason obscenity was all but abandoned was that child pornography was viewed
as the far more pressing problem. Under the Clinton administration, as
public concern about child sexual abuse escalated, the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Unit of the Department of Justice chose to focus its
limited resources on child pornography rather than obscenity.101
created by the men’s bodies. KIDD, supra note 26, at 72.
97
Grundberg, supra note 96.
98
Moore, supra note 6.
99
Josh Gerstein, Holder Accused of Neglecting Porn, POLITICO (Apr. 16, 2011), http://www.p
olitico.com/story/2011/04/holder-accused-of-neglecting-porn-053314#ixzz4GrYnOHA1
[https://perma.cc/YG7T-6K6R] (describing how Holder shut down the Justice department’s Obscenity Prosecution Task Force that had been set up during the Bush administration).
100
As I document in All Porn All the Time, the abandonment of obscenity law was a result of
multiple factors, including the rise of the sexual revolution and the mix of vexing and awkward
institutional and doctrinal problems the doctrine presented in First Amendment theory and practice. Obscenity was always a First Amendment anomaly. See Adler, All Porn All the Time, supra
note 50.
101
The Clinton administration’s policy was not explicitly announced but was clear in the pattern of prosecutions. In the period from 1992 to 2000, federal prosecutions of child pornography
increased more than fivefold, from 104 to 563 per year. In contrast, federal prosecutions of obscenity fell by more than half in the same period, from 44 cases in 1992 to 20 in 2000. See OFFICE OF
THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, No. I–2001–07, REVIEW OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND
OBSCENITY CRIMES REPORT (2001) available at https://oig.justice.gov/reports/plus/e0107/results.h
tm [https://perma.cc/698G-PG82]. The position to cut back on obscenity prosecutions was widely
maligned by conservative anti-pornography groups and legislators. See House Subcommittee Criticizes DOJ for Not Prosecuting Internet Obscenity, TECH L. J. (May 24, 2000), http://www.techlawjournal.com/crime/20000524.htm [https://perma.cc/GY5L-WBAN].
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Since that shift, the decline in obscenity prosecutions—and the explosion of adult pornography it both responded to and facilitated—have
made it hard to reverse course and to put the pornography genie back
in the bottle. In our porn-soaked contemporary culture, a pornographer’s defense is built into obscenity law’s reliance on community
standards: the government in an obscenity case must prove that the
material exceeds contemporary community standards.102 Yet given the
sea of pornography in which we live (a condition created in part by the
decline of obscenity law), it is now much harder for a prosecutor to prove
that material on trial deviates in its prurience and patent offensiveness
from the kind of stuff everyone else in the community has been watching. Perhaps this is why when the Bush administration’s Department
of Justice revived obscenity law in the early 2000s,103 it tended to target
extremely hard-core pornography on the fringes of the industry, material that might seem to a jury to be unlike the usual pornographic fare
they or their neighbors had grown accustomed to.104 In any event, the
Bush revival of obscenity law was quietly put to bed by the Obama administration, which (like Clinton’s) devoted its resources to child pornography rather than adult obscenity cases.105 Nonetheless, as I have
documented, obscenity law is still invoked sometimes to fills the gaps
for other doctrinal areas.106 And although there has been a resurgence
of conservative political rhetoric against pornography, there have been

102

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
See Barton Gellman, Recruits Sought for Porn Squad, WASH. POST (Sept. 24, 2005),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2005/09/20/recruits-sought-for-pornsquad/4efa6c1b-7be2-4a3a-a003-c1a3a2f5579a/ [https://perma.cc/Q9BE-SCUU]; see also Alberto
R. Gonzales, U.S Attorney General, Prepared Remarks at the U.S. Attorney’s Conference (Apr. 21,
2005) transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2005/042105usattorneys
conference.htm [https://perma.cc/GR6W-FAVR] (“I’ve made it clear that I intend to aggressively
combat the purveyors of obscene materials.”).
104
See Adler, All Porn All the Time, supra note 50, at 705–06.
105
See Gerstein, supra note 99; see also Jamshid Ghazi Askar, Prosecute Pornography? Why
Mitt Romney and President Obama Can’t Agree, DESERET NEWS (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.de
seretnews.com/article/865562332/Prosecute-pornography-Why-Mitt-Romney-and-PresidentObama-cant-agree.html?pg=all [https://perma.cc/HDH8-DQKE].
106
See, e.g., Adler, All Porn All the Time, supra note 50. For example, Congress has resorted
to obscenity law to achieve legislative agendas that have met with initial Supreme Court defeat.
For instance, Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003 (“Protect Act”), Pub. L. No. 108–21, § 504, 117 Stat. 650, 678 (2003), explicitly invoked
the rubric of obscenity law in response to the Supreme Court’s invalidation of Congress’s attempt
to ban virtual child pornography. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104–
208, § 121, 110 Stat 3009 (1996), invalidated by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234
(2002). Similarly, after the Supreme Court invalidated Congress’s attempt to criminalize depictions of animal cruelty in United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010), Congress used obscenity
law to rewrite the legislation in a way that would pass constitutional muster. See Animal Crush
Video Prohibition Act of 2010, 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2010); United States v. Richards, 755 F.3d 269 (5th
Cir. 2014) (upholding the revised law which uses obscenity law to ban “crush” videos).
103
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few prosecutions.107 Most would be unwinnable in my estimation because the pornographic culture in which we now live will present a significant hurdle for prosecutors pursuing obscenity convictions.
The second reason that obscenity law is less of a threat to art than
it once was has to do with related developments in art. The merger of
porn and art that Mapplethorpe pioneered, once a scandalous assault
on the modernist demarcation between art and non-art, high and low,
has become so commonplace as to be dull, even old-fashioned. Artist
John Currin, in an interview about a recent exhibition with its de
rigueur blend of art, appropriated images and hard-core pornography,
explained his use of porn by saying: “It’s not a shock tactic. In every art
school in the world there’s a guy doing porn. As a failed shock tactic,
that’s kind of interesting to me.”108
Of course, there’s still a lot of sex in museums and galleries; at
times it has seemed almost normative. And I still get an occasional call,
perhaps once every few years, from a museum that is worried about
sexual content that might cross the line, at least enough to invite controversy if not prosecution. (By contrast, the calls I get from institutions
or artists with concerns about other kinds of offensive art, or about the
possible reach of child pornography law, are more frequent.) And some
of the sexually infused art on view these days is so graphic that I assume any law review would be uncomfortable reproducing it, even in a
scholarly article, just as mainstream newspapers like the New York
Times still do not reproduce some of Mapplethorpe’s renowned works.109
But even so, it’s hard to think of any sexually explicit art work in our
porn-saturated world that has the power to shock us as Mapplethorpe
once did.
I do not want to discount entirely the possibility that the next sexual outlaw/artist could fall prey. The Mapplethorpe case shows us that
we should worry about the risk of selective prosecution of an underenforced law against an unpopular speaker.110 It is commonplace to say
that in our current era, the chances of being prosecuted for obscenity
are like the chances of being struck by lightning.111 But as
107

See Adler, What Happened to the Feminist Critique Of Pornography?, supra note 50, at 33–
34 (describing new conservative rhetoric around pornography and explaining that it has been
largely ineffective).
108
Karen Rosenberg, Influences: John Currin, N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 19, 2006), http://nymag.com/ar
ts/art/features/24355/ [https://perma.cc/M8RE-QW56].
109
The Times recently commented on its omission of an image of Mapplethorpe’s acclaimed
Man in a Polyester Suit which recently broke an auction record as described in McDermon supra
note 37.
110
See Elizabeth Glazer, When Obscenity Law Discriminates, 102 NW. U.L. REV. 1379 (2008)
(evaluating the discriminatory use of obscenity law against gays and lesbians).
111
Neil A. Lewis, A Prosecution Tests the Definition of Obscenity, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/28/us/28obscene.html [https://perma.cc/JJS3-2FAF].
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Mapplethorpe shows, the chances of being struck are not random; politically and sexually unpopular speakers seem particularly attractive.
Nonetheless, to the extent art thrives on transgression, in a postpostmodern, post-Mapplethorpe world, when it comes to porn, there is
not much left to transgress. While Mapplethorpe and other artists once
pioneered the dissolution of the art/porn boundary, many artists take
this dissolution for granted and have simply moved on. Because of
changes in art and culture, and related changes in legal enforcement,
obscenity law poses a far less significant threat to art institutions today
than it did thirty years ago.
III. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW AND ART: A GROWING ISSUE FOR
MUSEUMS AND GALLERIES
In contrast to the allegedly obscene pictures, which seem far less
scandalous by today’s standards than they were in 1990, Mapplethorpe’s A Perfect Moment included two photographs that have become
much more, not less, controversial over the past thirty years, to the
point where curators are quietly reluctant to show these images at all.
Both pictures are child nudes and raise the specter of child pornography. In one, called Jesse McBride, a young boy poses naked, perched on
a chair next to a refrigerator. In the other, called Rosie, a four-year-old
girl sits on a stone bench. She wears a dress, but her legs are bent in a
way that reveals she is wearing no underpants. She gazes unsmilingly,
at the camera, her face conveying perhaps curiosity, perhaps wariness.
To the extent it’s relevant, the mothers of both children were friends
with Mapplethorpe and arranged the photo shoots.112 As adults, both
children looked back with pride on the photos.113 McBride called the
picture of himself “angelic.”114
These pictures occupy a space of legal and cultural uncertainty.
They have become harder to show over the years, both in terms of the
cultural controversy they might provoke, but also because their legal
status has become more fragile over time. Indeed, I believe a museum
that displays these pictures today is taking on a risk (very small but not
impossible) of prosecution. As I will explain below, as a matter of First
Amendment law, I think these pictures ought to be protected, but the
law governing this area is so subjective and unpredictable that I cannot
say with certainty that they would be protected if prosecuted. That
112

Kim Masters, Jurors View Photos of Children; Mothers Approved of Mapplethorpe Works,
WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1990, at C1.
113
For an article about the trial, Jesse McBride who was then 18, posed nude in the same
position he had taken as a child, next to the portrait of his younger self, to demonstrate his approval of the original image. The image is reproduced in Meyer, supra note 13.
114
Patti Hartigan, The Picture of Innocence, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 8. 1990, at A40.
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these images have not been targeted owes more to prosecutorial discretion—the reluctance to pursue an art museum115—than to legal clarity.
The legal status of these two images stands in stark contrast to
that of the five pictures of adult S&M gay sex that were prosecuted in
Cincinnati, which have become far less legally and culturally risky over
the elapsed thirty years; they are all but certain to be protected given
the current state of obscenity law that I described above. Indeed, the
adult sex pictures prosecuted in Cincinnati were featured prominently
in the recent major museum retrospectives of Mapplethorpe’s work at
the Getty, LACMA, and the Guggenheim.116 But the curators for these
shows conspicuously omitted the two child images.117 Curators have
grown increasingly uncomfortable with these photographs. And, as with
other photographic child nudes by other artists, the pictures have quietly disappeared from some museum websites as well. In recent years,
at least two arts institutions have taken down two other photographer’s
pictures of children based on threats of prosecution.118 In my view, given
the evolution of child pornography law in the lower courts, the doctrine’s vast uncertainty, and the severe penalties that accompany a mistaken interpretation of it, this growing reluctance to show these kinds
of art images may be a defensible, if extremely risk-averse, legal position.
What explains this trajectory? What happened to change the dynamics of showing these works, legally and culturally? Once again, the
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Another significant factor is that as the crisis of child pornography has exploded, aided and
abetted by the digital revolution, prosecutors have far more pressing material to pursue than art—
enormous caches of images of hard-core sexual abuse committed against children.
116
See supra note 2. The Guggenheim completed a yearlong two-part show in 2019. Implicit
Tensions: Mapplethorpe Now, GUGGENHEIM MUSEUM, https://www.guggenheim.org/exhibition/ma
pplethorpe [https://perma.cc/VJ3R-YCXM] (last visited Sep. 1, 2020).
117
See Stoilas, supra note 50 (describing remarks of curator who chose not to include the two
pictures of children in an exhibition).
118
In 2013, the Kohler Arts Center removed artist Betsy Schneider’s series of photographs of
her daughter including ones that showed her as a naked baby on her changing table. Debra Lau
Whelan, Photographer Betsy Schneider on the Kohler Arts Center Banning Her Work, NAT’L COAL.
AGAINST CENSORSHIP (Aug. 12, 2013), http://ncac.org/blog/photographer-betsy-schneider-on-thekohler-arts-center-banning-her-work [https://perma.cc/RU4R-NDU7]. In Britain, the Tate Modern
removed Richard Prince’s well-known work called “Spiritual America” after police warning. Charlotte Higgins & Vikram Dodd, Tate Modern Removes Naked Brooke Shields Picture After Police
Visit, GUARDIAN (Sept. 30, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2009/sep/30/
brooke-shields-naked-tate-modern [https://perma.cc/33MT-S7QK]. The museum also shredded its
existing catalogue copies for fear of prosecution. Dave Itzkoff, Tate Modern Closes Richard Prince
Exhibition, Citing Concern Over Brooke Shields Photo, N.Y. TIMES: ARTSBEAT BLOG (Oct. 1, 2009:
11:53 AM), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/01/tate-modern-closes-richard-prince-exhibition-citing-concern-over-brooke-shields-photo/ [https://perma.cc/QCJ9-7BVC]. The photo is significant enough in Prince’s oeuvre that when the Guggenheim did a one-man show of Prince’s
work, they titled the exhibition “Spiritual America” after the photograph. See Richard Prince:
Spiritual America, GUGGENHEIM, https://www.guggenheim.org/exhibition/richard-prince-spiritual-america [https://perma.cc/K5DG-4S2U].
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answer points to a story about the mutually productive relationship between censorship law and culture.
A. Thirty Years Later: The Dramatic Expansion of Child Pornography Law
In 1990, when Mapplethorpe’s child pictures were shown in Cincinnati, child pornography law was in its infancy. Born in 1982, child pornography law developed at a time when child sexual abuse had only
recently come to light in the late 1970s as a widespread cultural crisis.119 Child pornography law grew up in a pre-digital era that barely
resembled our present one, in which digital and technological advances
have allowed the production and distribution of horrific child abuse images to skyrocket.120 As the crisis of child pornography has grown, child
pornography law has emerged as a complex, rapidly growing, and
deeply anomalous area of First Amendment jurisprudence.121 Just as
obscenity law began its decline, child pornography law grew to fill the
gap. The body of law that has developed since New York v. Ferber,122 the
Court’s first child pornography case, has made the Mapplethorpe child
images shown in Cincinnati more vulnerable to prosecution now than
they were thirty years ago.
Child pornography law began in 1982 with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Ferber, in which it encountered a novel First Amendment
problem: whether non-obscene123 sexual depictions of children—speech
not falling into any previously defined First Amendment exception—
could be constitutionally restricted.124 The Court’s answer was “yes.”
Although the Ferber Court announced five reasons that supported the
exclusion of child pornography from First Amendment protection,125 the
119

See Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 209 (2001).
See, e.g., Michael H. Keller and Gabriel J.X. Dance, The Internet Is Overrun with Images of
Child Sexual Abuse: What Went Wrong? N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/in
teractive/2019/09/28/us/child-sex-abuse.html [https://perma.cc/G2XP-UZA7].
121
Amy Adler, The ‘Dost Test’ in Child Pornography Law: ‘Trial by Rorschach Test’, in
REFINING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW: CRIME, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 81 (Carissa
Byrne Hessick, ed., U. Mich. Press, 2016).
122
458 U.S. 747 (1982).
123
The materials at issue in Ferber had been found not obscene by the jury, which was instructed to consider obscenity as well as child pornography charges against the defendant. See
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 751. Thus, the issue for the Court was sharply defined. Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) sets forth the Court’s obscenity standard. The “Miller test” asks: (1) whether
the “average person” would find that the speech, “taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest”; (2) whether it is “patently offensive”; and (3) “whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Id. (citations omitted).
124
Note this section draws in part on Adler, supra note 121.
125
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756. The five rationales set out in Ferber were as follows:
1. The State has a “compelling” interest in “safeguarding the physical and psychological
well-being of a minor.” Id. at 756–57 (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457
120
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fundamental focus of these rationales was this: child pornography must
be prohibited because of the grievous harm done to children in the production of the material.126 The creation of child pornography requires
an act of child sexual abuse. The opinion repeatedly emphasizes this
concern for the abuse “of children engaged in [the] production” of child
pornography. 127 Indeed, the Court framed the issue as whether “a child
has been physically or psychologically harmed in the production of the
work.” 128
When it comes to artistic expression, this urgent rationale animating child pornography law—to protect real children from abuse entailed
in creating the materials—leads to a pivotal distinction between this
area and obscenity law: unlike obscenity law, child pornography law
makes no explicit exception for works of “serious . . . artistic . . . value.”129 Whereas obscenity law was initially premised on the
U.S. 596, 607 (1982)).
2. Child pornography is “intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children in at least
two ways. First, the materials produced are a permanent record of the child’s participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circulation. Second, the distribution network for child pornography must be closed” in order to control the production of
child pornography. Id. at 759 (citations omitted). The Court went on to explain that the
production of child pornography is a “low-profile clandestine industry” and that the “most
expeditious if not the only practical method of law enforcement may be to dry up the
market for this material” by punishing its use. Id. at 760.
3. The advertising and selling of child pornography provide an economic motive for and
are thus an integral part of the production of child pornography. Id. at 761 (citations
omitted).
4. The possibility that there would be any material of value that would be prohibited
under the category of child pornography is “exceedingly modest, if not de minimis.” Id.
at 762.
5. Banning full categories of speech is an accepted approach in First Amendment law
and was therefore appropriate in this instance. Id. at 763–64.
126
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.
127
This conception of child pornography—that it is sexual abuse, that it is the core of sexual
abuse—was the foundation of the approach taken by courts, legislators, politicians, and the media.
See, e.g., ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 406 (1986) (“Child
pornography is child abuse.”) (emphasis in original); 142 CONG. REC. S-11886-01, S-11900 (Sept.
30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Biden) (“At the heart of the analysis . . . is a very straightforward
idea: Children who are used in the production of child pornography are victims of abuse, plain and
simple. And the pornographers, also plainly and simply, are child abusers.”); see also 132 CONG.
REC. S-14225-01 (Sept. 29, 1986) (statement of Sen. Roth) (“[T]hose who advertise in order to receive or deal in child pornography and child prostitution are as guilty of child abuse as the actual
child molester . . . .”). The Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography stated that “[c]hild
pornography must be considered as substantially inseparable from the problem of sexual abuse of
children . . . There can be no understanding of the special problem of child pornography until there
is understanding of the special way in which child pornography is child abuse.” ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 127, at 406 (emphasis in original). The abuse of an actual child is
“[t]he distinguishing characteristic of child pornography.” Id. at 405.
128
Id. at 765. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234
(2002) further underscored that production harm is the key to understanding child pornography
law.
129
Miller, 413 U.S. at 23 (establishing an exception in obscenity law for works that lack such
value). Although the Court has never entertained a child pornography case in which serious value
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worthlessness of certain expression,130 child pornography law excludes
speech from First Amendment protection because of the horrible abuse
from which it stems. This explains why the Court’s jurisprudence in this
area departs so dramatically from obscenity law: the merit of an artwork is irrelevant to the child who has been abused. As the Court explained, even if a work possesses serious value, that “bears no connection
to whether or not a child has been harmed in the production of the
work.”131 Thus, the only argument that led to the acquittal of the adult
sex pictures at the Mapplethorpe trial—the serious artistic value defense—is irrelevant under child pornography law.132 Furthermore, unlike
obscenity law, child pornography law does not require us to evaluate
works as a whole, a standard which is more speech protective, as described above.133
Meanwhile, the legal definition of child pornography has grown increasingly capacious over the last thirty years in the lower courts.134
was raised as a defense, the Court in Ferber considered the issue in the context of an overbreadth
claim, holding that the lack of an exception for serious value did not render the law “substantially”
overbroad. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 766–74. The concurring opinions in Ferber show some discord on
the question of serious value among the members of the court at the time of the 9-0 decision. Justice O’Connor wrote to emphasize that artistic value was irrelevant to the harm of child abuse that
child pornography law sought to eradicate. “[A] 12-year-old child photographed while masturbating surely suffers the same psychological harm whether the community labels the photograph ‘edifying’ or ‘tasteless.’ The audience’s appreciation of the depiction is simply irrelevant to New York’s
asserted interest in protecting children from psychological, emotional, and mental harm.” Id. at
774–75 (O’Connor, J., concurring). In contrast, Justice Brennan assumed that serious artistic
value would be a valid defense in a case if it were raised. He wrote that harm to a child and value
of a depiction bear an inverse relationship to one another: “[T]he Court’s assumption of harm to
the child resulting from the permanent record and circulation of the child’s participation lacks
much of its force where the depiction is a serious contribution to art or science.” Id. at 776 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
130
This is the fundamental principle of Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), the Court’s
first obscenity decision, in which it held that “obscenity” was a category of expression that lacked
First Amendment protection. In 1973 the Court introduced new rationales for banning obscenity.
131
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.
132
As we will see, due to an unusual feature of Ohio state law, the value of the work was
relevant in the Mapplethorpe trial, but such an exception is not required by the First Amendment.
See infra Part III.C.
133
A further distinction is that unlike obscenity law, child pornography law allows for the prosecution of mere possession, as opposed to distribution or production, of a suspect picture. In Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990), a case decided shortly before the Mapplethorpe trial, the Court
relied on the unique rationale underlying child pornography law to justify the decision and its
rejection of a basic tenet of obscenity law: that privacy rights protect the individual possessor of
obscenity in his own home even though the material he possesses is illegal to make or sell. See
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that the government cannot prohibit mere possession of obscene material); cf. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109 (“The State does not rely on a paternalistic interest in regulating Osborne’s mind. Rather, Ohio has enacted [its law prohibiting possession of child pornography] in order to protect the victims of child pornography . . . .”). As the Court
explained, the underlying crime of child sexual abuse entitles the States to “greater leeway in the
regulation” of child pornography than of obscenity. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756. This compelling rationale justifies the departure from traditional First Amendment strictures that child pornography
law permits.
134
See Adler, supra note 121.
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“Child pornography” is defined as “visual depictions” of “sexual conduct
involving a minor.”135 Federal law defines “sexually explicit conduct” as
“(A) sexual intercourse . . . ; (B) bestiality; (C) masturbation; (D) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or (E) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
pubic area of any person” under 18.136 The inclusion of this latter category—“lascivious exhibition of the genitals”—as part of the class of prohibited depictions of “sexually explicit conduct” introduces the most
problematic aspect of defining child pornography. How should courts
discern the difference between a criminally “lascivious” image and an
acceptable image of a child, such as an innocent family photo? The
Court has made clear that nudity is not the dividing line between protected speech and lascivious child pornography. Indeed, the Ferber
Court stated that “nudity, without more is protected expression.”137
Conversely, and surprisingly, a picture can be criminalized as “lascivious exhibition of the genitals” even if it contains no nudity, even if the
child’s genitals are not discernible,138 and even if it contains no sexual
conduct.139
The Supreme Court has so far offered no guidance on the question
of what constitutes a “lascivious exhibition of the genitals” or what differentiates such an image from constitutionally protected images of
135

18 U.S.C. § 2252. In response to Ferber, Congress quickly passed legislation modeled on the
New York statute upheld in that case. The result was the Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98–292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–2253 (2008)). That and
subsequent Acts have closely followed the Ferber definition.
136
18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)–(E). Congress adopted this definition from Ferber but changed the
word “lewd” to “lascivious” to clarify the distinction between child pornography law and obscenity
law, in which the word “lewd” is a term of art. Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–292,
98 Stat. 204 (1984); see also United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 830–32 (S.D. Cal. 1986)
(discussing the Act).
137
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765 n.18 (citations omitted).
138
Although the Supreme Court has never directly approved this interpretation, several influential Circuit Court opinions have held that a picture can be a lascivious exhibition of a child’s
genitals—and thus child pornography—even if the child’s genitals are not discernible and even if
the child is wearing clothes. United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733 (3d Cir. 1994); accord United
States v. Helton, 302 F. App’x. 842, 847 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding videotape defendant recorded of
an eleven-year-old girl wearing opaque underpants qualified as child pornography because of the
way it was framed); United States v. Grimes, 244 F.3d 375, 380 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding nude images of minors with pixel boxes covering their genitals are still lascivious within the meaning of
the federal child pornography statute, noting it is an easier determination than Knox); United
States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781, 790 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that a “reasonable jury could conclude
that the exhibition of pubic area was lascivious” in “beach scenes [of] girls wearing swimsuit bottoms”); People v. Spurlock, 114 Cal. App. 4th 1122, 1127 (2003) (holding child pornography and
child exploitations statutes could apply to an image depicting topless fifteen-year old girl in her
underwear with her legs spread); People v. Kongs, 30 Cal. App. 4th 1741, 1755–56 (1994) (following
Knox, finding photographs that zoomed in on girls’ pubic area were lascivious even though the
girls were wearing underwear); cf. U.S. v. McGlothlin, 391 Fed. App’x 542, 546 (7th Cir. 2010)
(finding probable cause existed regarding photographs of clothed boy in innocent activity but photographs focused on pubic area).
139
See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 639 F.3d 433, 440 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Thus, even images
of children acting innocently can be considered lascivious if they are intended to be sexual.”).
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children, nude or otherwise. In the absence of any guidance, and as the
onslaught of horrific child sexual abuse images has grown exponentially
over the years, lower courts have been busily filling the gap left open by
the Supreme Court. As I have documented in recent work, the result is
a growing body of law that has rendered the category of child pornography increasingly subjective at its edges.140
Indeed, many lower courts now evaluate whether a picture is lascivious based not on what happened to the child at issue but on whether
a pedophilic viewer might find the picture arousing.141 This allows for
the possible prosecution of pictures that were not the product of abuse
but still appeal to a deviant audience. In this way, the definition of child
pornography has come unmoored from its constitutional rationale—
that the pictures lack First Amendment protection because their production requires abuse.142
The leading case on the meaning of “lascivious exhibition” is United
States v. Dost,143 a 1986 California federal district court case that announced a six-part test for analyzing images. The Dost test, followed by
virtually all state and lower federal courts,144 identifies six factors that
are relevant to the determination of whether a picture constitutes a
“lascivious exhibition”:
(1) whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on the child’s
genitalia or pubic area;

140

Adler, supra note 121.
Id. (describing the debate in the lower courts between the objective and subjective interpretation of the Dost test and the subjective way in which some courts apply the Dost factors).
142
It is important to emphasize that to the extent pedophiles regard these photographs of children in a sexual way, the children are grievously harmed. But this harm seems to reside more in
the realm of a privacy violation (akin to revenge porn) and less in the kind of harm on which Ferber
was premised. The abuse now lies in how the pictures are used, not how they were produced. I
leave for another day the question of how to frame and prosecute this kind of harm as a privacy
violation.
143
636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239
(9th Cir. 1987).
144
Dost has been relied on by virtually all Circuits that have considered it. See, e.g., United
States v. Rivera, 546 F.3d 245, 250 (2d Cir. 2008); Knox, 32 F.3d at 747 (3d Cir. 1994); United
States v. Wolf, 890 F.2d 241, 244–46 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Rubio, 834 F.2d 442, 448
(5th Cir. 1987) (affirming use factors without specifically citing Dost); United States v. Amirault,
173 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1999) (emphasizing that factors are “neither comprehensive nor necessarily applicable in every situation”); United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781, 789 (8th Cir. 1999) (“We
find helpful the six criteria” in Dost); U.S. v. Brown, 579 F.3d 672, 680 (6th Cir. 2009) (“This Court,
in line with other Circuit courts, has applied a six-factor test for ‘lasciviousness,’ as set forth in
[Dost].”) Numerous district courts have followed Dost, as have state courts. See, e.g., Nebraska v.
Saulsbury, 498 N.W.2d 338 (Neb. 1993).
141
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(2) whether the setting of the visual depiction is sexually suggestive, i.e. in a place or pose generally associated with sexual activity;
(3) whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose or in inappropriate attire, considering the age of the child;
(4) whether the child is fully or partially clothed, or nude;
(5) whether the visual depiction suggests coyness or willingness
to engage in sexual activity;
(6) whether the visual depiction is intended or designed to elicit
a sexual response in the viewer.145
The test does not require that all factors be met to find that a depiction
is a lascivious exhibition.146 Indeed, one circuit court suggested that satisfying merely one of the six factors would suffice to criminalize a photograph as child pornography.147
B. Are the Mapplethorpe Pictures Protected Speech?
What would the result be today for the Mapplethorpe pictures described above, Jesse McBride and Rosie? Would a federal prosecution
succeed? In my view, the answer is unclear. (Given this uncertain status, I have not included the pictures here for the reader to assess.) On
my analysis of the images, in light of the way courts have interpreted
the Dost factors, I offer a few impressions. First, if merely one Dost factor is required, then certainly factor four, which asks if the child is nude,
is met. Furthermore, both pictures might be seen as having a focal point
on the child’s pubic area as well, thereby meeting both factors four and
one of the test. Justice Brennan argued that this focal point inquiry can
be easily manipulated. In elaborating on what he found to be the constitutional vagueness of a similar provision of a state law, Justice Brennan wrote in dissent, “the test appears to involve nothing more than a
subjective estimation of the centrality or prominence of the genitals in
a picture or other representation. Not only is this factor dependent on
the perspective and idiosyncrasies of the observer, it also is unconnected to whether the material at issue merits constitutional
145

Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 831.
Nor are the factors meant to be exhaustive. See, e.g., Horn, 187 F.3d at 789.
147
Wolf, 890 F.2d at 245 n.6; cf. United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1989)
(“Although more than one factor must be present in order to establish ‘lasciviousness,’ all six factors need not be present.”). The Second Circuit imposes no minimum number of Dost factors that
must be present for an image to constitute child pornography. United States v. Goodale, 831 F.
Supp. 2d 804, 810 (D. Vt. 2011) (citations omitted).
146
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protection.”148 The subjective nature of this inquiry was on full display
during the Mapplethorpe trial, when the prosecutor had the following
exchange on the subject with a defense witness, discussing the picture
of Jesse McBride:
“Isn’t the focus primarily between the legs of the child, the penis
area?” [the prosecutor] Prouty pursued.
“Mr. Prouty, I don’t have that reading of the direction of the
lines” Stein responded.
“Could anyone?” Prouty said.
Defense attorney Marc Mezibov objected. “The only person that
seems to have that reading is Mr. Prouty,” he said.149
Although I doubt that either Mapplethorpe image is in a “sexually
suggestive” setting under factor three, I note that this factor can be subject to surprising interpretations; for example, courts have divided on
whether a bathroom is a sexually suggestive setting.150 In a First Circuit case, the government argued, unsuccessfully (and in my view quite
startlingly) that a beach was a sexually suggestive setting because
“many honeymoons are planned around beach locations.”151 This kind
of subjective analysis can affect the interpretation of all the factors, not
just the third. And the subjectivity is significantly heightened in those
jurisdictions where courts require the material be viewed through the
imagined subjective vision of the pedophile voyeur when applying the
factors.152
There are significant arguments to be made for the defense of these
pictures. First is the most obvious: these pictures, taken with their parents’ approval, depict children being children, playing and cavorting in
an utterly non-sexual way that is more akin to a photo in a family album. To read them as sexual seems perverse. The picture of Rosie, for
example, was taken (with her mother’s consent) at a weekend wedding
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Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 138 (1990) (Brennan J., dissenting).
Masters, supra note 112.
150
The Tenth Circuit has held that a bathroom is a sexually suggestive setting under the second factor because “showers and bathtubs are frequent hosts to sexual encounters as portrayed on
television and film. It is potentially as much of a setting for sexual activity as an adult’s playroom.”
United States v. Larkin, 629 F.3d 177, 183 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Goodale, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 810.
In contrast, an Oklahoma district court found that a bathroom is “not necessarily a sexually suggestive location.” United States v. Helton, CR–07–70–T, 2007 WL 1674196 (W.D. Okla. June 7,
2007), aff’d, 302 Fed. App’x 842 (10th Cir. 2008).
151
United States v. Amirault, 173 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1999).
152
Adler, supra note 121.
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celebration at her house in northern England.153 Jesse’s mother explained that the picture of her son was taken at her apartment while
she was there and that her son was naked because he had just taken a
shower.154 The circumstances under which these photos were taken
seem worlds away from the horrors of sexual abuse that child pornography law is designed to prohibit (and that, unfortunately, the vast
amount of child pornography images portray). At trial, a local art critic
had testified that the pictures were “most innocent and nonsexual,”
comparing them to Renaissance cherubs or “modern-day angels.”155
Both children pictured looked back on these images with pride when
they were adults.156 Specifically, I would point to the sixth Dost factor,
as weighing heavily in favor that they were not designed to arouse an
erotic reaction by the viewer.157
Nonetheless, this argument does not guarantee the photographs’
protection. First, remember that a Dost conviction does not require that
all factors or even the majority of them be met, and in my view at least
two could arguably be met here. Second, there are counterarguments to
be made under the sixth factor. In particular, to counter the claim that
the work was not designed to arouse an erotic reaction in the viewer,
one could point to the very merger between art and pornography that
Mapplethorpe championed in his adult sex pictures. It’s also possible to
argue that the camera angle in the Rosie photograph, positioned as if to
see up the child’s dress, could be seen as sexual, particularly to a pedophile viewer.158 Furthermore, I might worry about a recurrence of the
kind of sinister prejudice that entered the debates about Mapplethorpe
in Congress during the time of the exhibition, when members of Congress suggested a link between Mapplethorpe’s homosexuality and a
pedophilic intent. For instance, a congressman from California said
that Mapplethorpe “was a child pornographer. He lived his homosexual,
erotic lifestyle and died horribly of AIDS.”159
153

Masters, supra note 112.
Id.
155
Id.
156
Meyer, supra note 13; KIDD supra note 26. But note that this may not be a sufficient test
for whether an image was a product of abuse, since so much child sexual abuse entails psychological grooming in which part of the abuse entails grooming the victim to believe he can trust his
abuser.
157
In this sense the case may be comparable to United States v. Amirault, 173 F.3d 28 (1st Cir.
1999). There the court said, “While it is conceivable that others may differ about some of the judgment calls we have made in our analysis of the photograph, we hesitate to dub this photograph
sexually explicit where many would find the depiction innocuous . . . we believe the only truly
striking aspects of the photograph to be the girl’s nakedness and her youth.” Id. at 25.
158
KIDD, supra note 26, at 61. Kidd goes on to argue that the picture is open to sexual and nonsexual interpretations.
159
See RICHARD MEYER, OUTLAW REPRESENTATION: CENSORSHIP AND HOMOSEXUALITY IN
TWENTIETH CENTURY ART 207 (2004) (quoting Representative Dornan); id. at 211 (describing the
154
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I do not interpret these pictures as sexual, nor do I interpret them
as the product of child sexual abuse. Yet given the current state of child
pornography law, I am not certain that the pictures would be protected
by a court applying the Dost test. Ultimately, my analysis points to a
conflict between the expansive reach of the Dost test and the underlying
rationale of child pornography law itself, to protect children from the
abuse that the production of child pornography necessarily entails.160
C. Why the Pictures Won
What saved the pictures in 1990? The answer stems from two features of the Ohio law at issue in the Mapplethorpe trial. Although that
law had potentially sweeping aspects,161 it was far more generous to
defendants than federal child pornography law in two important respects.162
First, the Ohio law made an exception for parental consent, an exception that federal law does not provide (and indeed, one that may be
ill-advised given the unfortunate reality that many children are abused
by their own family members).163 The mothers of both children, Jesse
and Rosie, signed affidavits and testified expressing their approval of
the images; these affidavits figured as an affirmative defense to the
charges.164

longstanding stereotype of the “homosexual as child molester” that was deployed against Mapplethorpe).
160
But see supra note 142 where I suggest that some images that do not entail production harm
in the traditional sense still impose a kind of privacy harm to the child pictured that ought to be
legally cognizable albeit under a different First Amendment rubric.
161
In a separate case, the Supreme Court had evaluated the constitutionality of the Ohio law
only shortly before the Mapplethorpe case was decided. The dissenting justices in that case argued
that the law swept more broadly than Ferber and was overbroad. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S.
103, 126 (1990) (Brennan J., dissenting).
162
The charges were brought under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § R.C. 2907.323(A)(3), which prohibited, inter alia, the possession or viewing of “any material . . . that shows a minor who is not
the person’s child or ward in a state of nudity . . . . ” This very Ohio statute had withstood an
overbreadth challenge in Osborne, 495 U.S. 103, decided just shortly before the Mapplethorpe trial.
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the statute as it had been construed and limited by the Ohio
Supreme Court to prohibit “the possession or viewing of material or performance of a minor who
is in a state of nudity, where such nudity constitutes a lewd exhibition or involves a graphic focus
on the genitals, and where the person depicted is neither the child nor the ward of the person
charged.” Id. at 114 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). As so construed, a majority of the Court
found that the statute was in line with Ferber.
163
The relevant provision of Ohio law provided protection for a defendant who “knows that the
parents, guardian, or custodian has consented in writing to the photographing or use of the minor
in a state of nudity and to the manner in which the material or performance is used or transferred.”
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323(A)(3)(b) (Supp. 1989),
164
See City of Cincinnati v. Contemporary Arts Ctr., 566 N.E.2d 207 (Hamilton Cty. Mun. Ct
1990) (describing affirmative defense based on “affidavits filed from the parents of the minor children consenting to possession and displaying of the photographs”); see also KIDD, supra note 26,
at 72 (describing the mothers’ testimony).
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The second feature of the Ohio law that was more generous to defendants than the First Amendment requires was a provision to allow
exceptions for work “presented for a bona fide artistic . . . purpose.”165
As I indicated previously, the Supreme Court has made clear that the
defense of artistic value is not a mandatory feature of child pornography
law. Of course, states are free to make laws that are more speech-protective than the Constitution requires, and Ohio’s law, by carving out a
sphere for artistic works, did so in this respect.
Thus, the fact that these images were exonerated in 1990 does not
settle their legal status today if they were prosecuted. The Mapplethorpe defense was able to invoke two idiosyncratic speech-protective
features of Ohio law that depart from what the Supreme Court has indicated is required by the First Amendment. Neither issue would be
relevant in a federal prosecution.
IV. HOW MEANING SHIFTS: THE RELEVANCE FOR FIRST AMENDMENT
LAW
One of the most revealing aspects of the Mapplethorpe case was a
ruling issued by the Court that addressed the nature of artistic meaning.166 The Court’s analysis exposed a clash that reverberates to this
day between legal and artistic views on how to assess the “meaning” of
art.
The issue arose in the context of a ruling on a pretrial motion in
limine filed by the state of Ohio on a key aspect of obscenity law. Since
1957, in Roth v. United States,167 the U.S. Supreme Court made it a
requirement of obscenity law that a work be evaluated “as a whole.” The
previous approach that Roth replaced had been far less protective of
artistic expression; it allowed prosecutors to focus on isolated passages
of a work,168 plucking out of a novel only the naughty bits. Yet while
Roth’s new “work as a whole” standard was relatively easy to apply to
works of literature—the unit of measurement is the whole book—the
Mapplethorpe trial raised a question of first impression for a court:
what constitutes the “work as a whole” for an art exhibit? Is it the entire
exhibit? Or is each individual picture a “work as a whole” in its own
right? The question ultimately implicates the relationship between
meaning and context.
In the Mapplethorpe case, this question was potentially pivotal:
The five S&M sex pictures on trial, extremely graphic, appeared in a
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OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323(A)(3) (Supp. 1989).
City of Cincinnati v. Contemporary Arts Ctr., 566 N.E.2d 207 (Hamilton Cty. Mun. Ct 1990).
354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
R. v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868) (Eng.).
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larger exhibition of 175 works dominated by G-rated, tasteful portraits
and still lifes. Indeed, the curatorial installation of the X Portfolio was
calculated to challenge the assumption that the sexual works could be
viewed apart from their context. As explained above, the sex pictures
were displayed in a grid, mixed with the Y Portfolio’s elegant flowers.
The arrangement invited the viewer to consider the sex pictures’ unity
with the other works. In this way, the exhibition was curated to illustrate a central tenet of Mapplethorpe’s photographic project. As the artist explained in his own words: “When I’ve exhibited pictures, I’ve tried
to juxtapose a flower, then a picture of a cock, then a portrait, so that
you could see they were the same.”169
Yet the Court rejected the contention that a work’s meaning could
depend on its context. It ruled instead that each picture was a work as
a whole in its own right. In elaborating on this ruling, the judge offered
a stark vision of how images produce meaning. The judge wrote, “the
pictures speak for themselves . . . . The click of the shutter has frozen
the dots, colors, shapes, and whatever finishing chemicals necessary,
into a manmade instant of time. Never can that ‘moment’ be legitimately changed.”170
Note two assumptions undergirding this statement. First, the court
assumes that the image is a self-contained universe that requires no
interpretation—it “speaks for itself.”171 This is a longstanding—and
problematic—theme in the history of the legal treatment of images in
both First Amendment law and also other legal realms.172 As I have
argued in previous work, this assumed ability of images to “speak for
themselves” helps explain the systematic suspicion that images are not
fully “speech” for purposes of the First Amendment, and the greater free
speech protection afforded verbal as opposed to visual forms of representation.173 Rebecca Tushnet has documented a similar problem in
copyright law, where courts frequently view images as so transparent
that they need no interpretation.174
Second, the court’s analysis is built on the assumption that a work’s
meaning cannot vary: it is “frozen” in the “instant of time” it was
169

Kardon, supra note 11 (quoting Mapplethorpe).
Contemporary Arts Ctr., 566 N.E.2d at 217 – 218.
171
Id. at 217.
172
See generally Amy Adler, The First Amendment and the Second Commandment, 57 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 41 (2012–2013) (arguing that the First Amendment systematically offers greater protection for verbal as opposed to visual forms of representation in part because images are viewed
as so transparent as not to be speech).
173
Id.; see also Adler, supra note 54.
174
See Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 683, 687 (2012) (noting that courts have taken “two positions on nontextual creative works
such as images: they are either transparent, or they are opaque” and “[w]hen courts treat images
as transparent, they deny that interpretation is necessary.”).
170
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created.175 The analysis pictures the meaning of a photograph as eternally bound to its moment of creation, so that it can’t fluctuate over time
or across different contexts. As the court wrote, “never can that moment
be legitimately changed.”176 This view—that visual images have a “frozen,” static and unchanging meaning—has had a stranglehold on legal
analyses of art, not only in First Amendment law177 but also in other
doctrinal areas, as I have previously explored.178
The fallacy of this legal assumption is particularly evident in the
changing racial meanings that have been ascribed over the years to
Mapplethorpe’s works. Earlier I discussed Mapplethorpe’s photographs
of Black men. I argued that anxieties about race and interracial desire
had fueled the conservative outrage over Mapplethorpe in 1990 America. Of course, there is no First Amendment doctrine under which these
photographs of Black men could be prosecuted for their racial content
alone. Obscenity law filled the gap.
At the same time that conservatives feared these pictures, some
Black critics, artists, and curators of the 1980s and 1990s explored the
disturbing racial politics of Mapplethorpe’s images of Black males, criticizing Mapplethorpe’s fetishization and objectification of the Black
male body. At the same time, however, there were champions of the
work, who saw it as having an activist potential to subvert rather than
reinforce racial stereotypes.179
175

Contemporary Arts Ctr., 566 N.E.2d at 217–18.
Id. at 218.
177
See Adler, supra note 172, at 45–58. There I explore the assumption that images have a
single static meaning. I note that the Supreme Court in the Summum case took a position closer
to my own, offering a view of visual images as given to fluctuating meaning overtime, across contexts, and based on who views them. See Summum v. Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. 460, 477 (2009)
(explaining that the meaning of a monument could be “altered by the subsequent addition of other
monuments in the same vicinity” or over time).
178
See generally Amy Adler, Fair Use and the Future of Art, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 559 (2016)
(analyzing how copyright law’s fair use test, which asks courts to assign “meaning” to works of
visual art, has come to threaten artistic creativity). For an articulation of how the precise opposite
view of meaning has purchase in the art world, see DAVID JOSELIT, AFTER ART 45–48 (2013) (arguing against attempts to tether artworks to meanings and envisioning art as “a commons, which
resists the enclosure of meaning”).
179
There have been a range of political readings of Mapplethorpe’s Black Book. Glen Ligon’s
extraordinary artwork, Notes on the Margin of the Black Book (1991–93), explores the artist’s reaction to the troubling racial themes of the Mapplethorpe work. In an important series of essays,
the critic Kobena Mercer had initially decried the racial fetishism of the work, but subsequently
revised his reading to see the work as containing the activist possibility of undermining the “white
supremacist imaginary.” Compare Kobena Mercer, Imagining the Black Man’s Sex, in
PHOTOGRAPHY/POLITICS: TWO 61–9 (Pat Holland et al. eds., 1987) with Kobena Mercer, Skin Head
Sex Thing: Racial Difference and the Homoerotic Imaginary, in HOW DO I LOOK?: QUEER FILM AND
VIDEO 169, 192 (Bad Object Choices ed., 1991); see also Wesley Morris, Last Taboo: Why Pop Culture Just Can’t Deal with Black Male Sexuality, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/10/30/magazine/black-male-sexuality-last-taboo.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article [https://perma.cc/FB4E-2Z5X] (noting that at
the time of the works creation one could see the “radical, defiant feat of inscribing black men —
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I believe that in the thirty years since the Mapplethorpe trial, the
racial component of Mapplethorpe’s work has grown more inescapable
to us as viewers, even eclipsing the sexual content of the work, which
has become comparatively more mundane. As our society has increasingly grown aware of the troubling implications of mainstream depictions of race and Blackness, I believe that Mapplethorpe’s Black males
may make us even more uncomfortable than they once did, in contrast
to Mapplethorpe’s S&M images, which time has to some extent
tamed.180 In this way, we see that even though the pictures have stayed
the same, the lens through which we view the pictures has shifted,
bringing new meanings to the fore.
Ironically, the story of Mapplethorpe’s work, from the time of its
creation to present, demonstrates the folly of the court’s approach to
meaning. Instead of showing us that the meaning of his images were
“frozen” in the “instant of time” they were created and that meaning
can “never” change, we see instead a proliferation of fluctuating meanings that the works have evoked. The X Portfolio photographs were
taken in the late 1970s when AIDS was unknown; Mapplethorpe was
documenting his world of sexual experimentation in a time without fear
of the still-undiscovered virus that was brewing as the photographs
were taken. But after Mapplethorpe’s death, and in the hands of conservative critics, the work came to stand for the threat posed by AIDS
and by homosexuality to American culture. Conversely, to the political
left, Mapplethorpe’s work came to stand for artistic freedom.181
None of these interpretations had any basis in the moment of the
works’ creation. They all arose in the history of its use and reception.
And over the ensuing years since the trial, Mapplethorpe’s meanings
have continued to change. We see the work differently now, as attitudes
about homosexuality, pornography, sexuality, child sexual abuse, race,
and art have all changed.
The story I have told about the works’ shifting legal status bears
testament to its evolving meaning. Our changing cultural perspective
not only reflects but also informs the legal shifts I have described, as
the works have become more vulnerable to one legal doctrine and less
black gay men — into portraiture”); Evan Moffitt, Picture Imperfect, 179 FRIEZE 184 (2016) available at https://www.frieze.com/article/picture-imperfect-0 [https://perma.cc/3PGH-HKBT] (exploring racial critiques of Mapplethorpe’s work). For my discussion of the racial politics of these images
as well as my reading of Kobena Mercer’s evolving view of Mapplethorpe, see Amy Adler, What’s
Left: Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Problem for Artistic Expression, 84 CAL L. REV. 1499
(1996).
180
See Arthur Lubow, supra note 89 (observing that “the images that continue to make viewers
uncomfortable, and rightly so, are the ones of nude black models” ).
181
See Meyer, supra note 5, at 242 (describing how the work came to symbolize freedom in the
face of “intolerance and homophobia”). As Meyer wrote, our interpretation of the work “cannot be
dissociated from the political panic and public controversy it provoked in 1989–90.” Id.
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vulnerable to another. Therefore, to understand how misguided the
court was in its assessment of how art produces “meaning,” we can look
at the changing legal status of Mapplethorpe’s art over the last thirty
years. The history of Mapplethorpe’s work, from its moment of creation
to its present reception, bears witness to the way in which art’s “meaning,” rather than “frozen,” evolves over time and across contexts. Ultimately these evolving meanings informed the shifting legal status of
Mapplethorpe’s art.
CONCLUSION
The Mapplethorpe trial, fueled by anxieties about AIDS, homosexuality, sadomasochism, pornography, race, government funding for
the arts, and the vanishing boundary between art and smut, was the
defining battle in the culture wars of post-Reagan American. As I have
argued, it also marked a turning point in the First Amendment doctrines governing sexual speech. The trial marked the first obscenity
prosecution against an art museum in the history of this country. But
since that time, obscenity law has receded in importance and the oncescandalous, allegedly obscene photos from the trial have become widely
accepted in museums and in the art market. Child pornography law has
followed the opposite course. In contrast to the allegedly obscene pictures, which pose almost no legal risk today, the two photographs of
children that were on trial have become more, not less, controversial
over the past thirty years, to the point where curators are quietly reluctant to show these images at all. In my view, these photos now occupy
a space of legal and cultural uncertainty. Ultimately my account shows
how these dramatic changes in free speech law have been inextricably
intertwined with and influenced by the battles over social norms that
the Mapplethorpe trial unleashed.

